UUIDv7 ingestion validation
Opik lets a client choose the id of a trace or span it creates. That id must be a UUIDv7, and
the timestamp embedded in its top 48 bits is what ClickHouse uses to place the row in a partition.
UUIDv7 ingestion validation bounds that timestamp at write time, so a client embedding wrong
timestamps fails loudly instead of quietly degrading the partition layout.
Why it exists
Section titled “Why it exists”A client that embeds a wrong timestamp does more than mislabel one row. An id claiming a date
years in the future lands in a partition that retention never reaches, and one claiming a date years
in the past lands in a partition that has already been retained away. Either way the partition
layout degrades, silently, and the row is hard to find again.
Bounding the timestamp at ingestion turns that into an HTTP 400 on the offending write, so a broken client surfaces as a failed request rather than as partition corruption discovered months later.
What is validated
Section titled “What is validated”Two separate checks run on a client-supplied id.
The version check. The id must be a version 7 UUID, or the write is rejected with
reason: not_v7. This check is always on and none of the settings below affect it.
The window check. This is the configurable part, and it applies in two forms:
- Both bounds — when a trace or span is created with a caller-chosen
id. An embedded timestamp further than the window into either the past (too_old) or the future (too_far_future) is rejected. - The future bound only — when a single trace or span is updated by id, and wherever an existing
id is referenced: a span's
traceIdandparentSpanId, and ids referenced by dataset items, feedback scores, comments, attachments and guardrails. Old ids are legitimate on those paths — a late span on a month-old trace is normal — so only future-dating is rejected.
Where the ids come from
Section titled “Where the ids come from”The checks live in the backend's service layer, so the creation paths are covered alike: the REST API, the batch ingestion endpoints, and the OpenTelemetry endpoint.
Worth knowing if you only send OTel: the OpenTelemetry endpoint does not carry Opik ids, so the
backend derives them — but it derives them from your spans' start timestamps, not from the
current time, so that a trace and its spans share one reference point. An exporter replaying spans
whose start times are outside the window is therefore rejected too, even though it never set an id
itself. Backfilling historical traces over OTel needs a window wide enough to cover them.
Before you turn it on
Section titled “Before you turn it on”Upgrade the LiteLLM Opik integration if you use it
LiteLLM's native Opik integration emitted out-of-window ids until BerriAI/litellm#31294. If you send traces to Opik through that integration, upgrade LiteLLM to
v1.94.0-rc.1or newer before enabling validation. On an older LiteLLM, ingestion through it starts returning 400 as soon as the check is on.Check your own instrumentation
If your code passes an explicit
idto Opik, confirm the value is a UUIDv7 built from the current time. The Opik SDKs do this for you; hand-rolled ids, ids replayed from an archive, and ids derived from another system's identifiers are the cases that fail.Find offenders without breaking them
Turn validation on in audit mode first. Out-of-window ids are then counted and logged, but still ingested, so you can identify every offending client before anything starts failing.
Configuration
Section titled “Configuration”| Environment variable | Helm value (databaseAnalytics.*) |
Default | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
UUID_VALIDATION_ENABLED |
uuidV7ValidationEnabled |
false |
Master switch for the window check. While false, no timestamp check runs at ingestion. |
UUID_VALIDATION_AUDIT_ONLY |
uuidV7ValidationAuditOnly |
false |
Count and log out-of-window ids instead of rejecting them. Only has an effect while UUID_VALIDATION_ENABLED is true. |
UUID_VALIDATION_WINDOW |
uuidV7ValidationWindow |
24h |
How far from now an embedded timestamp may be, in either direction. Must be between 12h and 45d. |
Together the first two settings give three modes:
UUID_VALIDATION_ENABLED |
UUID_VALIDATION_AUDIT_ONLY |
Effective mode |
|---|---|---|
false |
(ignored) | Disabled — no timestamp check at ingestion. The default. |
true |
true |
Audit — count and log, still ingest |
true |
false |
Reject — HTTP 400 |
Docker Compose
Section titled “Docker Compose”The Compose file reads all three from the environment, so exporting them before starting Opik is enough:
export UUID_VALIDATION_ENABLED=true
export UUID_VALIDATION_AUDIT_ONLY=false
export UUID_VALIDATION_WINDOW=24h
./opik.shdatabaseAnalytics:
uuidV7ValidationEnabled: true
uuidV7ValidationAuditOnly: false
uuidV7ValidationWindow: 24hAudit (shadow) mode
Section titled “Audit (shadow) mode”Audit mode is the safe way to introduce validation on a deployment whose clients you do not fully control. Out-of-window ids are counted and logged, but the write still goes through:
databaseAnalytics:
uuidV7ValidationEnabled: true
uuidV7ValidationAuditOnly: trueEach detection is logged at INFO with a fixed, searchable prefix:
UUIDv7 audit: would-reject id, embedded timestamp '...' outside window '...', reason '...', resource '...', workspace '...'Once no new detections are arriving for the clients you care about, set
uuidV7ValidationAuditOnly back to false to start enforcing. Query the counter's rate, not
its value, when deciding that — see below.
Monitoring
Section titled “Monitoring”Both modes increment the opik.ingestion.uuid_v7.rejected counter, so one query covers the whole
rollout:
| Label | Values |
|---|---|
mode |
audit (counted, still ingested) or reject (HTTP 400) |
reason |
too_old and too_far_future on either path. not_v7 only ever appears with mode=reject — the version check is unconditional and runs before the window check, so it never reaches the audit path. |
resource |
Audit path only. The entity whose id failed: Trace, Span, Span trace, Span parent, and the referenced-id names used by the other endpoints (dataset_item trace, project, annotation queue, and so on). |
workspace_id |
Audit path only. unknown on the paths that do not carry the request workspace. |
http_route |
Reject path only. The matched route, for example /v1/private/traces/batch. |
opik.ingestion.uuid_v7.rejected is a cumulative, monotonic counter: it only ever increases, so
its value never returns to zero once a single id has failed. Gate the rollout on an interval delta
or rate — increase(...[1h]) or rate(...[5m]) in PromQL, with the labels you care about — rather
than on the raw total.
Watch it for a full traffic cycle before switching from audit to reject, not just the first hours: a client that only runs nightly will not show up in a one-hour sample.
Turning it back off
Section titled “Turning it back off”If legitimate traffic starts being rejected, you have three options, in order of preference:
- Drop to audit mode — keeps the signal, stops the 400s:
YAML databaseAnalytics: uuidV7ValidationAuditOnly: true - Widen the window — if the rejected ids are legitimate but just outside
24h. The accepted range is12h–45d:YAML databaseAnalytics: uuidV7ValidationWindow: 48h - Turn the check off entirely:
YAML databaseAnalytics: uuidV7ValidationEnabled: false
All three take effect once the backend has restarted. Nothing is migrated and no data is rewritten, so any of them is safe to do at any time — writes that were rejected while the check was on are not recovered, though, so the client has to send them again.
Note that none of these switch off the version check: a non-UUIDv7 id is rejected regardless.
Next steps
Section titled “Next steps”- Self-host troubleshooting — other ingestion and startup failures
- Self-hosting overview — how the backend picks up configuration